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Perhaps

no subject under the head of per-

there is

sonal property Yhich presents as many difficulties to the
young stufent

of law as that

of gifts.

It seems tiat as

back as CoFmnentators have made mention of it,
have prevailed
tract,

as

to

whether a

gift

opinions

varioas

was not properly

far

a

con-

anJ to-day ey'n/in many cases it is considered a mooted

question.

It

is

not my punp~ase

in

treating

this

subject

to

give the opinions of the various writers on gifts, but will bd
content by citing authorities whenever circumstances require
It

such.

seems that the subject of gifts

from English customs
ness the
were

or laws,

but in

custom prevailed, and so it

creatures

of Roman Law as

did not originate

the days of Roman greatis

thnat dona or gifts

,iell as that

of Common Law.

A gift as defined in Bovier's Law Dictionary consists in a
voluntary transfer of a thing without consideration.
not my purpose
or not a gift
tracts.
Barbeyrac

at any length the question whether

discuss

can be properly

classed under th-e hedd of con-

While there are authorities
holding that gifts

certain kinds
quite

to

of contracts,

firmly established

of law that

a g4ft is

It is

such as Toullier and

can properly be classed under
still

the doctrine

-"as become

among A.erican and English xriters

not properly

a contract.

It is true,

however, that when a gift has been made perfect, it partakes

2
somewhat of the nature of an executed contract.

It has, how-

ever, been maintained in every period of English Law that delivery was indispensable in making a gift.

Hence

the following maxim has been accepted by all:

it is that

"Donatio per-

ficitur possessione accipientfs
Before attempting to make any division of gifts, it
might be well to state that certain conditions must be fulfilled before a gift is completed.

The party or parties con-

templating making a gift must possess sufficient mental capacity.

The rules which would be applicable in making a con-

tract would hold in executing a gift.

Perhaps it is safe to

say that greater care should be exercised,

since

the give

or

donor receives no benefit in return, unless with a view of
pleasure.

Another important factor which should be considered

is whether the maker exercised absolute free dom in making
the gift.

If a gift has been perfected under undue influ-

ence, as, for example, xhere actual fraud or confidential relations exist, .

in case of father and son, physician and

patient, and lawyer and client, or the gift has been obtained
by the person standing in such relations, is prima facie void,
and the burden of proof is thrown on the donee to show that
the gift was the unbiassed act of the donor.
Ledell v Starr, 5 C. E. Green (N. J.)
Garvier v Williams, 44 Mo. 465.

274.

Boyd v De La Montaguie, 76 N. Y. 49o.
Lake v Ramsey, 36 Barb. 49.
Forman v Smith, 7 Lans. 443.
Ferguson v Lanery, '4 Ala. 510.
Jennings v Mc Connell, 17 Ili. 14b.
Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516.
Whitehead v Kennedy, 69 N. Y. 462.
Whipple v Barton, 63 N. 1-. 612.
The English law
own,

seems to go still

unless it

a

position of not being able to

can be shown to the

the donor had competent

of L.

Cas.

Gifts are divided into two
vivos, and gifts causa mortis.

advice in

pectation

that

acting.

772.
classes; gifts inter

Gifts

inter vivos or siniple

are such as one party makes to arther

gifts

receive benefits

of the court

satisfaction

and independent
7 H.

Smith v Key,

tow-

confidential relations

and places persons who hold

ards such in

than our

farther

of death as a moving cause.

without

the ex-

The perawn who makes

such a gift must be competent to contract and the gift must
be perfected.
effect.

That is,

it must go into

immediate and absolute

It has, however, been held in some

cases that where

a gift is intendeJ in praesenti, and is accompanied with sach
delivery as the nature of the property
operates

at once.

But it is

will admit,

t:iat it

far better that all transactions

are fully completed, and that nothing essential remains
done

in order to make certain of its validity.

remembered that
it

,Yhile the donor

happens that gifts

to be

It must be

receives no consideration,

as promises

are often tried

to be enfore-

4
ed,
or

as,
in

fcr example,

an agreement

consideration of love

to the property
agreements

to give without

or affection,

consideration

transfers

no

litle

and gives no riglit to one for damages.

are considered mere naked

Such

agreements.

Ca-penter v Dodge, 20 Vt. 55.
Pope v Dobson, ! Ill. 360.
A promissory note
maker

cannot be enforced,

make a gift

for a

intended

nor is

an

purely

as a

gift

by the

expression of' promise to

specified benevolent

object

binding,

unless

the transfer has been made and the gift completed.
Noble v Smith, 2 Johns. 52.
Fink v Cox, l8 Johns. 145.
This principle

should not be confused,

however,

voluntary subscriptions

for charitable

promises of the several

subscribers are held sufficient

sideration to enforce the promise.
settled

doctrine,

that

deavoring to perfect

Young v Young,
It
essential

succeed them.
but if

80 N.

has become firmly

to the consu-nmation

simultaneous

it

purposes, for the mutual

Y.

it

succeeds,

in

en-

422.

a gift,

precedes no 1ew
it

interfere

gift.

with the mords of donation,
If

to

established
of

con-

This appears to be the

equity will refuse

an imperfect

with

makes perfect

that delivery
still

it

is

need not be

but may precede or

delivery

in

necessary;

that which before

was

in-

5
choate.

And it shouldl be remembered that after the gift has

been made complete by delivery

,

it is not necessary for the

donee to retain possession of the property.

The delivery neud

not be directly to the donee, but may be to a third person
for him.

If the delivery

the purpose

of delivering

to the third person is simply
it

to the donee,

for

as agent or mes-

senger of the donor, the gift is not complete until the subject of the rift

actually

is

delivered to the donee.

And

until the gift has been completed by delivery to the donee,
the donor can revoke the agent's authority aria resume possession of the gift.
Scott v Lauman, 104 Pa. St. 503.
Marston v Marston, 21 N.
. 491.
Hill v Stevenson, 63 Me. 364.
People v Johnson, 14 Ill.
342.
Smith v Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229.
Bedell v Earli, 33 N. Y. 561.
Irish v Motting, 47 Barb. 370.
Judge Audson in his opinion in Beaver v Beaver, 117
N. Y.,

said that

on page 430,

"a deposit in a savings bank by

one person of his own money to the credit of another is
sistent with an intent

on the part of the fepositor

the money to the other."

to give

Perhaps there is no case which throis

more light on the question of delivery to
that of Beaver v Beaver.

con-

third parties than

The father, John Beaver, had

depos-

ited in the Ulster County Savings Bank $1,000.00 to the credit
of his son Aziel.

There was no evidence except

thnat John

6
Beaver said:
On the trial

"I started Aziel in life,--gave him $1,000.00."
defendants,

beinL, his mother and sister,

claimed

that John Beaver had retained the pass-book of the bank up
to his death, anJ claimed that no gift had been made.

They

acting as administrators demanded the moneys which had been
deposited to the credit of Aziel,
ment was refused by the Bank,

as it

was supposed.

Pay-

and a suit was brought which

resulted in the following opinions from the several courts in
,Which it was tried.

A judgment was rendered in favor of de-

fendants before Judge Edwards in

the Ulster County Circuit,

and afterwards judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
53 Hun 258.

The Court of Appeals afterwards reversed the

judgment and ordered a new trial.

The court

said on the trial

that the only evidence relied upon to establish an intent on
the part of the father to make a gift to Aziel,

his son,

was

the transaction at the Bank on the day of deposit; that there
was no proof of any oral statements that had transpired afterwards, and fur that reason the court held that in the case
there were two essential elements lacking;
give,

viz:,

an intent to

and a delivery of the subject of the alleged gift.

Judge Edwards in

commenting upon the questions as offered by

the Court of Appeals said:

"Since there had been proof estab-

lished to show that declarations had been made by the father
at the time of the deposit -which would necessarily lead me to

7
think ti.at the money had been deposited as a gift."

He held

that the admission of one that he had made a gift to another
established a consummated gift.
In this case it was claimed by tne widow of Beaver
that the fact that the Rank book had not been given over to
Aziel and still

'emained in the possession of the Bank, it

belonged to her, and should go to the a[iministrator of the :leceased.

This is a question which is ofttimes the occasion of

many legal controversies.

For the

question is, Is the money

deposited in trust or inte nded as a gift.

I shall deem it

sufficient by giving the rule which seems to govern in such
cases.

In questions of parol gifts to children it would seem

it is not necessary that any solemn act of delivery should be
made.

The formal ceremonynof delivery is not essential if it

appears that the donor intended an actual gift at the time,
and evidence of such intention by some act wiicn may be fairly
construed as a delivery under such circumstances it is quite
evident that the question of trust could not be considered,
and a gift is properly established.

Where a person holds a

bank-book for another for a number of years, it is regarded
that it was kept as trustee.
Willis v Smith, 91 N. Y. 31.
Motie v Bailey, c- N. Y. 234.
Martin v '3 zik, 7F, N~. ' . LA5.

8
However,
that

where a

ed to
is

shich

after

death,

took

depositor

the niece

a pass-book

New Hampshire,

It was held in Young v Young,
gift

although a delivery

donee or to

some person

ion and title

supra, tihat to

of the donor,

belong-

Connecticut

e

establish a valid

of the subject of the gift
for him,

his

This doctrine

and

Maryland,

to the

so as to divest the possess-

be shown,

yet

it

is

necessary that manual delivery should be made;
fer is

it

effects,

in whose name it was deposited.

also supported in

was hed
until

it

and kept

among his

was found

it

it

59',

40 Vt.

Hovard v Smythe,

in

not always
intent to trane

sufficient.
Gray v Gray, 55 N. Y. 72.
Ross v Draper, 56 N. H. 404.
Hildebrandt v Brewer, 6 Tex. 45.
We have seen,

therefore,

the donee only that he be able

that the law requires of

to show that the donor has rel-

inquished dIominion over it in his favor.

Another kind of de-

livery which I shall briefly consider is constructive delivery.
This is where a gift is perfected by delivery of the means of
viz.,

obtaining it;

a key to a trunk or warehouse.

But tiis

must be accompanied by words of gift of the contents of the
receptacle.

The transaction must

intended to make the gift

of the article

symbol was the means of access.
and just,

as it

checks

clearly show that

to which the key or

This appears

and prevents fraud

the owner

to be e 4 uitable

from being

practiced.

9
of this

A very good illustration
er v Burr,

45 Parb.

given in

A xoman confined

15.

the case of Coop-

to her bed deliver-

taken care of her for many years,

who haJi

ed to the plaintiff,

is

the keys of her trunk and bureau accompanied by
Held that this

gift.

was fufficient

to

Lhe words

constitute

a

valid

gi ft.
It

seems

as a rule that property of every

be -the subject of a valid gift,
eal.

kind may

both corporeal and. incorpor-

However, the subject must be certain, and it has been

held in 17 N. J. Eq. 419, that no gift was bizdding unless the
property was

for me to give all the kinds of

Yould be quite impossible
property which are subject
vor to point oat a few.
action,

to gift

savings bank books,

promissory notes,

, so

I shall only endea-

Promissory notes, debts, choses in
etc.,

are some of those

that are

The first which I shall consider

of most frequent occurrence.
is

It

in esse at the time of the attempted gift.

for these

ject of much legal discussion.

especially

are often the sub-

It is quite evident, and I

might say that the donee of such a note cannot enforce its
paymenz either in law or in equity.
just that

such is

the future is

the case,

as

And it seems fair and

the promise

without consideration.

and can only be said

in

If such were true it

would leave open a broad avenue for fraud.
at any time,

to pay money

It can be revoked

to become a gift

when mone

10
has been paid, or when it is in the hands of a bona fide holder fo. val-e who has no knowled-,e
a,.ion

Lo

of the wan6 of consider-

be lacking in tne noue.

A check received as a gift

is incomplete until presenued or recognized by

Lne donee,

unless some specified req es,. has been made by

the diawer to

the bank.
which is
men

In
io

the

guide

suating that

obligations,

forgiveness of a
us is

that a

-e

receipt o,

general rule

written acKnowledge-

tne donee has been released

and that the same

forever release the debtor.

is

intended

f.or

furtner

as a gift,

will

This does not hold true, however,

in cases in which part payment
tha-L

debt,

is made.

It oftens happens

a person pays part of a debt, and is told by his

that he need not pay the remeinder.
of the

creditor would in

unless his

Such an act on the part

no way bar his right for the

intention of cancelling

cred.itor

the debt

balance,

had been fully

acted upon.
Bishop on Contracts, Sec. 50/
Gray v Barton, 55 i. Y. 68.
Ellsworth vFo~g, 3 Vt. 355.
Draper v Hitt, 43 Vt. 439.
Larkin v Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y.
B,Tt not the
would be no delivery

333.

)alancing of the book alone,
to

complete

and perfect

tne

as there
-ift.

I

shall not attempt to discuss or even distinguish between the
uses of gifts and trusts, b-tt shall simpl

shox That seems to

be the method of ascertaining how a trust is created.

Uo

ii
particular form of words is requisite.

The intent

is what

the courts seek.
Nisher v Fields, 10 Johns. 496, 505.
Parry on Trusts, Sec. 89.
In

reference

would be difficult

to savings

to give any definite

of each case are known.
to give full

Pahk books or deposits,

a~ithority

rule until

it

the facts

The following references will serve
in

the matter.

Smith v Bank, 64 N. H. 400.
Davis v Noy, 125 Mass. 590.
M'artin v Funk, 75 N. Y. 137.
Gilman v Mc Ardle, 99 N. Y. 458.
Another essential
gifts is acceptance.

WXhile

element in the consideration of
it is a general rule that in all

contracts acceptance is necessary, it is also true in the case
of gifts.
sary.

But

Yet evidence of only a slight acceptance is neceswhen gifts

are entirely beneficial to the donee,

his acceptance is presumed.

And the

same principle has been

wisely established in the case of infants.

For since they are

unable to make a complete contract, it would be difficult to
say that they were capable of receiving gifts unless some provision had been made.

It is held, though, in some cases, that

unless the donee knew of the gift during the life of the donorJ
acceptance

will not be presumed.
Clark v Clark, 108 Mass. 522.
Scott v 7erkshire Savings Bank, 140 Mass. 157.
Pope v :urlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt. 2 4.

12
.ar

It
in

ismy purpose

which gifts

child.

may be made,

Where a parent

him to use it,
gift.
made

to cite

but one of the many cases

and trat

delivers

the presumption

is

between parent

property
is

that

to a

it

and

child and allows

was

intended

as a

This rule is more particularly true if the sift was
at the time the child marries,

but since the

father is

looked upon as the head of the family, a gift made before the
parental authority ceases is considered invalid.
may be shown t!,at

such gift

is

valid.

Where a

his son that he might havea certain colt

if

he

However, it

father

said to

yould raise it,

and there was no other evidence tending to show that the
er intended

the son to have the

colt,

and

there was no

fath-

evi-

dence of delivery, it was held that the title to the colt
did not pass.
Mdatlock v Powell,

96 N.

C.

499.

Put in Fletcher v Fletcher, 55 Vt.
that where a father in the presence of his

325, it was held

family presented to

his son a carriage in the carriage-house, it was sufLficient
to vest the title in the son.

liumerous examples might be

cited, but the few which I have mentioned will serve to show
quite clearly the general

rile

that applies betyeen parents

and children.
There is one more important question which can be
properly classed under this head,

and that is where property

13
has been given to friends or even strangers
defraud creditors .

with an intent to

It appears to be firmly established that
All the

any gift made under any such circumstances is void.
doctrines of the

courts of law and equity hold that

which seems to be tainted

in

any gift

any way with fraud is void.

In

the old English case of Reade v Livingston, supra, the rule
was laid down that any voluntary transfer of real estate or
chattels with a view to defraud creditors was void.
indeed true that such is the universal rule.

It is

For it certainly

would be embarassing if not dangerous to the rights of creditors, and would open up an avenue to fraud.
was enacted

during the reign of Elizabeth,

been the law of this

This statute

and has ever since

country.

The nature of proof required to establish a gift is
similar to any other question of fact, being
the jury.

a question for

The mere delivery is not sufficient.

The intention

of the parties and their acts are things which must be passed
upon by a jury.

Anything which tends to show that

the donee

had done acts in favor of the donor, or great affection existing

between

However,

them,

would have a tendency

these are only circumstances

endeavored

to point out

to sustain a gift.

that may arise.

a few of the rules in

are -to be found under the head of s-ifts inter

I have

cases which
vivos,

now consider the second class of gifts, causa mortis.

and shall

14
A gift

defined as a

causa mortis is

or causing

prehension of death by delivering

made in

-ift

ap-

to be deliVered

the possession of any personal goods to another.

These gifts

,Tere the subject of frequent discussion in tie Enilish courts.
Justinian, apprehensive of fraud in these gifts, required
them to be executed in the presence of five witnesses.
causa mortis differs from a gift

A gift

inter vivos in tnat it is

revocable by the donor, and the mental capacity must be the
same as in making a will.

They

,vere always looked upon with

suspicion, since they did a-ay virtually
of property described in the will.
until

The Kift is not complete

And it

the death of the donor.

hension of death, and delivered.

with certain amount

must be made in

appre-

Great strictness and clear

ppoof are therefore required to establish such gifts; and they
can only be upheld when the intention of the donor is clear
and such intent

and defihite,

is

fully carried out by

execu-

tion.
ish, 43 0. St. 462.
Gains v
Delmotte v Taylor, 1 Redf. 417.
Hatch v Atkinson, 56 Ile. 324.
Marshall v Berry, 13 Allen 43, note.
It

would appear by the definition

above quoted that

only personal property can be -Jven in this manner.

It has

also been held in Vermont and South Carolina that real estate
cannot be

incluted in

a

-ift

causa mortis.

.!each v 1Veach, 24 Vt. 591.
Gilmore v Mitesides, Dudley
In Curtis v Barous,
of real

(S. C.

5, Hun 165, a delivery of a deed

estate was sustained as such a gift.

whether land

) 13.

wams a proper subject of a gift

The question
was not raised.

At the present time all kinds of personal property with few
valid gift

exceptions may be the subject of a

causa mortis,

whether the property be corporeal or incorporeal.
settled generally in this country
certificate of stock,

It is not

whether the delivery of a

without some assignment of the shares,

is a good gift causa mortis.

It is not a valid gift in Eng-

land or New Jersey.
Moore v Moore, L. R. 1 Eq. 474.
Edgerton v Edgerton, 17 N. J. Eq. 419.
In New York it appears that a delivery of a certificate of stock is good as a gift causa mortis without an assignment, or even without a complete transfer of legal title.
Walsh v Sexton, 55 Barb. 251.
In this case the donor ',vas the orner of sixty shares
of stock in a corporation, and executed an assignment of twenty shares which he delivered to his wife to be delivered to
the plaintiff.

It was held sufficient, and the administrator

was ordered to make legal transfer.
ing the opinion, said:

Peckham, J.,

in deliver-

"I concur in the views expressed by

16
the courts which have riot sustained
ciple and in policy.

such a rift,

both in prin-

Rut the authorities are the other way.

In my judgment this doctrine is fraught with the greatest
danger.

It leads into temptation fror:. .rich ie all pray to

be delivered, and it greatly facilitates fraud.
thing is wrong.

The

Nhole

But it is settled by authority, and we are

not at liberty to reverse it."

There is also a diversity of

opinion as to whether or not a person can transfer the whole
of his property as a Jonatio causa mortis.

In Vermont it has

been held that the donor may dispose of all his property by
such a gift.

In Pennsylvania it has been decided in one case

that the principal part may be given, while in another case
the court said:that all could not be disposed of in such manner, as partaking of a testamentary character, and contrary
to the spirit of the law of wills.

In Iarshall v Berry, supra

a Massachusetts case, there is a Jictum agreeing with the Penn.
sylvania view that such a gift can only apply to

certain spe-

cific articles, and not to a disposition of t. e donor's estate.
-.each v Idach, 24 Vt. 5 1.
,lichener v Dule, 23 Pa. St. 58.
Headley v Kirby, 16 Pa. St. 326.
As to the donor's promissory note, it cannot be the
subject of a gift causa mortis, the mere promise of the maker
being a nudum pactum;

but the note of a third party may be

17
given,

the law being the

in

same as

inter

gifts

bills, promissory notes, and other evidences of debt,
yiven,

payable to order, may be

even if
is

note or bond secured by a rrort,-ahe
witjA the note or bond,
in

kept in

although
TIhere a

not endorsed.
-iven,

althou h the mortgage

and is

the transfer,

,-onds,

vivos.

e goes

tue rort,a

not mentioned

is

the donor's possession.

Vrigit v Wright, 1 Cowen 598.
2essions v Fosely, 4 Cush. 87.
Druke v Heiken, 61 Cal. 346.

ment or acceptance

the s ift

by the bank

the check is

the death of tne donor before

it

incomplete,

and

paid or acceptance

providing the donee has not

acts as a revocation of the gift,
transferred

is

pay-

but until

The donor's own check may be given,

to a bona fide holder for value without notice

before the death of the donor.
Vatter of Smither, 30 Hun 632.
National Bank v Williams, 13 Mich.
It

has also been held in

282.

Pennsylvania that a

life

insurance policy, payable to the legal representative of the
assured, can be given causa mortis by
without
gift

an agreement.

It

is

requisite

causa mortis that it be made in

of the donor.

This gift

elivery
.-

of tie policy
of a

to the validity
contemplation

of death

can only be made by a person who

thinks his death near at hand,

and

,7ho makes his

of and on account of riis approaching death.

gift

in

vieff

In New York it is

18
not necessary that the apprehension of death shall come from
illness.

The courts hold that it

may arise from infirmity or

old age, or from external or anticipated danger.

It must be

founded upon more than some indefinite or unsettled apprehension.

The donor must be in a condition to fear approachirg

death from the proximate or impending peril, or from illness
In Tennessee it has been held

which precedes dissolution.

that the anticipation of death to a soldier enlisting in the
army was sufficient

foundation for a gift;

but in

Irish v

:utting, supra, a New York case, it has beet- decided to the
contrary.

made during the last illness of

Where a gift is

the donor and a short time before his death,

it

is

presumed to

be a gift causa mortis and not inter vivos, and revocable by
The burden of proof would be on

the recovery of the donor.
the donee to show t.,at it

was a -ift

inter vivos,

and there-

fore absolute and irrevocable.
Emery v Clough, 63 11. H. 553.
Rhodes v Child, 64 Pa. St. 18.
Allen v Polseczky, 31 Me. 338.
Thompson v Thompson, 12 Tex. 327.
The subject of a gift causa mortis must be delivered
or the gift is not complete or valid.
of delivery required is
inter vivos.

The law as to the kind

substantially the same as in

gifts

As a rule the best delivery of which the arti-

cle is capable is required.

A delivery by symbol ahen the
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thing itself can be reaiily
inr,

or easily handea over, as by giv-

a key to a box or a jewel

case as a symbol,

when the re-

ceptacle or its contents might easily have passe, from hand to
hand, is generally held to be insufficient.

There must be

something done in order to change the possession from the
donor to the donee.

So necessary is delivery to the validity

of a -,ift of this kind, as was
N. H. 147, that

stated in Cutting v Gilman, 41

even if the property was in the donee's poss-

ession or in the hands of a third party, there would be no
gift for want of needed delivery to complete it.

If it is

delivered to the donee and again comes into possession of the
donor, it raises the presumption t' at it is revoked.

Schouler

on Personal Property, Sec. 163, says: "The real question is
whether the donor has by such transfer intentionally and practically parted with his dominion of the property; and we must
view his facts accordingly."

It is settled that delivery to

a third person for a donee is as effective delivery as to the
donee,

even if the donor dies before the property reaches the

hands of the donee.

But delivery to an agent as agent for

the giver to perform the act or make the delivery only after
the death of the donor would amount to nothing.

Like other

frifts there mnst be an acceptance to complete the gift.

This

acceptance may be by the donee after the death of the donor,
especially -where the delivery is to a third person for the

benefit of the donee.
A pift causa mortis is not valid against the claims
The only property which a man can legally dis-

of creditors.
pose of without

conside ation

paying his debts;
generous.

the balance remaining after

is

a man must be

that is,

just before he is

If it is needed to pay the debts and taken by the

administrator

vill g;o to the donee

the surplus if

purpose,

for that

any remaining

in preference to the intestate's estate.

Kiff v Weaver, 94 N. C. 274.
There may be conditions annexed to this kind of a
A very common one is that the donee shall pay the ex-

gift.

penses of the funeral.
We have noticed thus
gifts

inter

vivos when completed,

cured by fraud or force,
is not so with a gift
ocable

in

donor;
case in

(3)

except where

causa mortis.

(2)

an ordinary gift
they

-y

viz:

(1)

or

are pro-

ar- absolute and irrevocable.

three instances;
peril;

a particular

far that

But it

They are specially revThe donor's recovery

the de.rth of the donee before

By his own act revoking the gift.

And in

from
the

an early

New York it has been held that where a local statute

causes tne revocation of one's will by the subsequent birth
of a child, tlie same consequences iould follow a gift causa
mort i s.
The evidence tending

to establish such a gift

must

21
be clear and convincing.
on the donee, as,

The burden of proof is necessarily

in the first place,

so many opportunities

and such strong temptations present themselves to unscrupulous
persons to pretend death-bed
danger of having an entirely
secondly,

fabricated

case

set up;

withoiat any imputation of fraudulent

it

is

in

a mortal

so

donations, that there is alxrays

easy to mistake the meaning
illness,

and by a slight

and,

contrivance,

of a person languishing
change of words

to

con-

vert the expressions of intended benefit into an actual sift
of the property;

and no case of this description ought to pre-

vail unless it is supported by
most unequivocal character.

evidence of the clearest

and

